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Abstract 
This paper discusses the timing and the optimal trade policy in 
the presence of oligopolistic industries and free entry. Collie 
(1994) proved that an importing government should not commit a 
countervailing duty in response to a foreign export subsidy. We 
show that his main conclusion does not always hold, since the 
timing, as well as the optimal trade policy, depends on the 
number of firms in both countries and the characteristic of the 
industry, i.e. no entry or free entry. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A player can determine its timing (or the order of its action) 
as well as its action. As to this issue, Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990) have proved the endogenous timing of action in the duopoly 
game under perfect information. Albaek (1990) has also shown that 
there can be a unique natural Stackelberg equilibrium under 
incomplete information. Applying the endogenous timing game to 
trade policy games. Collie (1994) has shown that there is such a 
unique Stackelberg equilibrium that an importing (= domestic) 
government, being a leader, uses an import tariff policy and an 
exporting (= foreign) government, being a follower, uses an 
export subsidy policy and that the domestic government benefits 
from a larger export subsidy than in a Nash equilibrium, while 
the foreign government benefits from a lower import tariff than 
in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, his main suggestion is that the 
domestic government should not commit a countervailing duty in 
response to a foreign export subsidy. It means that the domestic 
government should be a leader, not a follower. 
It is assumed in Collie (1994) that the number of firms in both 
countries is identical. But, it was shown in Dixit (1984) that 
the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy (tax) if the number 
of exporting firms is relatively smaller (larger) than that of 
importing firms. Because the slope of the reaction functions of 
both governments depends on the number of firms in both 
countries, the results about the timing, as well as the optimal 
trade policy, are not necessarily identical to those of Collie 
(1994), if the number of firms in each country is not identical, 
or if it is allowed to be free entry. 
Generalizing the model of Collie (1994), we will reconsider the 
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s'n ] (Note that N, N* is omited) . We will give W = W[tn , s* f ] . 
Then, from (13) and (17*), it holds that W > Wn . Also, taking 
into account that (16) is negative at a Nash equilibrium, and 
(17), W1 > W. Thus, W1 > Wn . Next, from (8), it will be denoted 
that Wf = W[tf , s* ' ] = W[t[s* ' ] , s* ' ] , and that Wn = W[tn , s' n ] = 
W[t[s*n], s*n]. Thus, taking into account (7) (or (8)), (9), 
(13), and (17*), it holds that Wn > Wf . Therefore, we obtain 
(18). 
Similarly, as to (18*), first, it will be denoted that W1 = 
W[s-'t tf ] , and W* n = W*[s*n, tn ] . We will give W' = W*[s'n, 
tf ] . Then, from (13*) and (17), it holds that W ' > W* n . Also, 
taking into account that (16*) is negative at a Nash equilibrium, 
and (17*), W ' > W ' . Thus, W* ' > Wn. Next, from (8*), it will 
be denoted that W* f = W' [ s' f , t1 ] = W* [ s* [ t1 ] , t1 ] , and that W n 
= W*[s'n, tn ] = W[s-[tn], tn ] . Thus, taking into account (7*) 
(or (8*)), (9*), (13*), and (17), it holds that W'f > W n . 
Therefore, we obtain (18*). Q.E.D. 
Appendix 4. Proof of Lemma 8. 
As to (36*), first, taking into account (30), and (33*), and 
evaluating (35*) at the Nash equilibirum, the sign of (35*) is 
negative. Thus, s*n ( = 0) > s*• . Also, if the foreign government 
is a follower, as shown above, it will use a free trade policy as 
in the Nash equilibrium. Thus, s'n = s*f =0. 
Secondly, as to (36), it has been shown that t1 = tn . Also, 
taking into account (30) and s'n (= 0) > s* ' , it holds that tn = 
t[s'n], and V = t[s*']. Thus, tn > tf . Q.E.D. 
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